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Introduction
Concern about global imbalances has been building since the 1990s and analysts
from a variety of disciplines have called attention to aspects of the problem ranging from
the unsustainability of the US current account position to the role of “under” and “over”
saving rates in deficit and surplus countries. 2 There are, however, some critical issues
relating to the buildup in US debt and other global imbalances that have yet to be fully
explored. Many analysts assume, for example, that imbalances arise as a result of
developments and policies within national economies. This paper argues that imbalances
– including “under” and “over” saving – also result from interactions at the global level
and are at least partially shaped by pressures generated by the current international
monetary and payments systems on the direction and volume of international capital
flows.
The paper begins with a discussion of the ways in which a fiat currency and
privatized payments system under the guardianship of a few wealthy developed countries
and their private multinational financial institutions have contributed to the problem.
This is followed by an examination of U.S. debt and global imbalances that focuses on
the U.S. international investment position, the link between foreign exchange reserves
held in the U.S. and liquidity creation and the link between net capital flows and credit
expansion. Part II analyses the risks in failing to address the U.S. foreign debt problem
and Part III offers proposals needed to address the monetary aspects of global
imbalances.
Part I. The Role of International Monetary Arrangements in Creating U.S. Debt
and Global Imbalances
Monetary Arrangements and Global Economic Responses
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, most
cross-border payments are denominated in the national currencies of relatively few socalled strong currency countries. Other countries - those whose currencies are not widely
used in international transactions or held as external savings - “earn” the means of
payment by exporting goods and services to strong currency countries or borrow strong
currencies on the expectation that exports to the countries that issue them will provide the
external savings needed to service their debts. While this underlying bias toward exportled growth was not initiated by the shift in global monetary arrangements in the 1970s,
1

This paper is a revised and updated version of the author/s contribution to a joint paper with Stephany
Griffith-Jones presented at the FONDAD conference on Global Imbalances and the US Debt Problem in
2006.
2
For earlier analyses of the problem, see Blecker (1999), D’Arista (1999), Godley (1999), Greider (2000)
and Plender (2000).

1

that shift (and the pricing of oil in dollars) augmented support for such policies in many
developed countries while moving export capacity to the center of development policy.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescribed export-led-growth policies for all
developing and emerging economies after the financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s,
despite little evidence that strong currency countries other than the US were willing to
accept the current account deficits needed to ensure their success.
Meanwhile, the role of key currencies as means of payment ensures that a few
strong currencies also have become stores of value in the global economy in holdings of
both private investors and official institutions. The rapid growth in key currencies as
stores of value since the 1970s is recorded in the international investment positions of
countries and the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) reports of holdings in external
markets. 3 The US international investment position is arguably the most important
record of the growing importance of the stock of holdings of external savings but, while
many analysts focus on the evidence it provides of the rising external debt of the US, the
impact of that debt on the US domestic and global economies is less widely discussed.
The following examination of the US international investment position sets the stage for
our analysis of its impact on the US and global economies.
The US International Investment Position
The status of the US as the world’s dominant importer of both goods and capital
is relatively recent. When Wall Street crashed in October 1987, US residents still owned
more assets abroad than the amount of US assets owned by foreigners. In other words,
the US international investment position was still positive, as it had been since World
War I. But the increased borrowing required to finance growing trade deficits had
already taken a toll on that once-strong creditor position. By 1989, the US became a net
debtor nation and its external (i.e., foreign) liabilities continued to mount throughout the
1990s. At year-end 1996, the net debt reached a record $548 billion (with assets at
market values). One year later, it the crossed the $1 trillion threshold – equivalent to 13
percent of gross domestic product – and by the end of 1998 rose to $1.5 trillion or 18
percent of GDP.
The volume of capital flows to and from the US increased after 1998 and, in
2004, set new records despite concerns about the willingness of foreigners to continue
financing the nation’s ongoing current account deficits. But, at the end of that year, the
magnitude of the gap between a record inflow of new investment in US assets by
foreigners ($1,450.2 billion) and an equally unprecedented outflow for new foreign
investment by US residents ($867.8 billion) was masked by valuation adjustments. 4 The
result was a relatively modest increase in the net value of US liabilities to foreigners
between 2003 and 2004
3
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In 2005, net foreign inflows ($1,212.2 billion) were slightly smaller than in 2004
but US net investment abroad ($426.8 billion) dropped to half the amount of the previous
year. 5 As in 2004, however, valuation adjustments – primarily greater price appreciation
of US held foreign stocks than of foreign-held US stocks – pushed up the value of USowned assets abroad by an amount ($577.1 billion) larger than the financial outflow
while the value of foreign-owned assets in the US dropped by $110.9 billion. Once
again, valuation changes dampened the increase in the US international investment
position; the net value of US liabilities to foreigners increased by only -$97.5 billion to $2,546.2 billion and fell from 20.5 to 20.1 percent of GDP (see Tables 1 and 2).
The net inflow of foreign investment in both 2004 and 2005 was much larger than
the amounts needed to finance US current account deficits and the excessive inflow of
foreign savings sloshed back into the global economy as US residents recycled the
surplus capital they could not use profitably at home. 6 Nevertheless – even as dollar
devaluation in 2004 and price appreciation of US-owned foreign assets in 2005
moderated the increase in the net negative investment position – the dollar value of
foreign-held assets as a share of US GDP rose more rapidly than the rate of US growth.
In 2005, foreign-held assets climbed to 107.4 percent of US GDP, up from 97.0 percent
at year-end 2003.
There are important asymmetries in the composition of American residents’
foreign holdings versus foreign residents’ holdings in the US. One is the fact that a
larger share of US holdings abroad (32 percent at year-end 2005) are direct investments
in plant and equipment while only 20.5 percent of US liabilities to foreigners are direct
investments. Foreign investors have tended to purchase marketable financial assets
(stocks, bonds, government securities and bank liabilities) that can be liquidated more
easily than direct investments. Another is the difference in the holdings of US and
foreign public sectors. The central bank and other US government agencies own
relatively few foreign assets while foreign official institutions owned some $2.2 trillion
of US financial assets or about 16.3 percent of the $13.5 trillion total stock of foreign
investment at year-end 2005. As these asymmetries suggest, the US pool of liquid
foreign assets might be too small to prevent substantial market disruptions if there were a
decline or abrupt withdrawal of foreign funding that required sales of foreign holdings,
while their already large holdings of US assets might limit other countries’ ability or
willingness to cushion withdrawals with loans or further purchases.
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In 2004, the net inflow of foreign official funds ($387.8 billion) broke the
previous year’s record ($278.3 billion) and focused attention on these investors as a
major source of capital flows to the US. But their contribution to the total inflow was
only 27.4 percent and dropped to 16.5 percent in 2005. The much larger stocks and flows
of private foreign investment better illustrate the context and incentives for the record
volume of flows in these and other years. One incentive was the rapid expansion in
global liquidity that, the BIS argued, was created by stimulative monetary policies in
industrial countries in response to the recession of 2001-2002 (BIS 2004a). Ample
liquidity and historically low interest rates had sparked a search for yield that, as the
Federal Reserve began its measured increases in policy rates, shifted borrowing in dollars
for carry trade transactions to borrowing in yen and renewed speculative interest in US
financial assets. 7
The role of carry trades in driving international capital flows appears to have
intensified in the fourth quarter of 2005. The BIS notes anecdotal reports of a surge in
such transactions by hedge funds using short positions in yen and other low interest rate
currencies to fund long dollar positions. But even as US interest rates rose, the search for
yield continued to push up equity markets in emerging economies and lowered their
sovereign bond spreads. In the third quarter of 2005, foreign portfolio investment in
emerging economies hit near-record levels and rebounded in November after a short selloff in October (BIS 2005c).
As the build-up in liquidity in the US, Japan and many emerging economies
intensified in 2005, it appears to have perpetuated the round-robin, procyclical pattern of
international capital flows. For example, the BIS noted that Japan’s bull market in
equities had become the favorite destination for foreign investors (BIS 2005c). But the
currency appreciation that might have been associated with foreign investment in equities
was offset by lending in yen for carry trade investments in dollar assets. Thus with flows
into one or more segments of a national market spilling out and into other national
markets – even returning, in some cases, to the markets from which flows had originated
– excess liquidity was distributed throughout the global economy, exerting ongoing,
downward pressure on interest rates.
These developments call into question the assumption that, as former Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan asserted, capital flows are “exact mirror
images of current account balances”. But Greenspan also acknowledged that rising rates
of return on US assets “resulted in private capital investments from abroad that
chronically exceeded the current account deficit” (Greenspan 2003, p.3). What he failed
to add is that these excessive investments from abroad expand the supply of credit and
have, as their mirror image, rising levels of debt owed by domestic sectors. 8 The link
7

Cross-border carry trades involve borrowing in a low-yielding currency and investing in assets
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between them is critical in determining whether or not current levels of either external or
domestic debt are sustainable because both have the potential to constrain global as well
as US domestic demand.

Foreign Exchange Reserves and Liquidity Creation
Clearly, the private sector has been and remains the driving force in international
capital flows and a major source of funding for US credit expansion. 9 Nevertheless, the
excessive scale of foreign private inflows and the outflows of US investment they
financed increased incentives for larger inflows of foreign official investment as well.
Sizable spillovers of investment into emerging economies – again, in response to the
search for yield - prompted monetary authorities in these countries to step up the level of
intervention to curb currency appreciation and moderate the growth of money and credit
in their domestic economies. But the dollars they purchased found their way back into
US financial markets in the form of foreign official purchases of US Treasury and agency
securities – investments that contributed to further increases in liquidity in US and global
markets and additional downward pressure on interest rates. 10 As a result, these
institutions and their reserve holdings play a critical role in the expansion – and potential
contraction – of global liquidity.
A key element of the currency-based international monetary system that
superseded Bretton Woods is that, unlike gold, foreign exchange reserves are interestbearing assets denominated in a strong currency. 11 Dollar reserves held in the US are
invested in US Treasury securities and are liabilities of the Treasury. They are not
included in stocks and flows of the US central banks’ liabilities, are outside its direct
influence and, thus, constitute a system for parallel open market operations with the same
liquidity-creating powers as those of the Fed. Moreover, changes in reserve holdings
respond procyclically to Federal Reserve initiatives, amplifying the impact of a given
policy objective.
For example, when the dollar depreciates because the Federal Reserve has taken
policy actions to lower US interest rates by buying Treasuries in the open market, foreign
official institutions buy dollars with their own currencies in their own or in external
percent of total lending respectively and helped push the debt of domestic nonfinancial sectors from 189.8
percent of GDP in 2001 to 211.4 percent at year-end 2005 (FRS,Flow of Funds).
9
As the 2005 BIS Annual Report noted, dollar holdings of foreign official institutions in the US and in
offshore deposits accounted for only about a third of the long-dollar position of non-US residents.
10
The level of activity in external markets in 2004 also reflects the extraordinary buildup in global liquidity
in this period. Cross-border and foreign currency claims of BIS reporting banks grew by $2.28 trillion –
more than twice the change in 2003 and substantially larger than the previous record increase of $1.33
trillion in 1997 (BIS 2005b).
11
Central banks also held foreign exchange assets as international reserves in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries and their use expanded after 1922 as a means of augmenting limited gold supplies. The fact that
returns on these assets increase reserve holdings was seen then (as now) as an attractive feature.
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markets to prevent their currencies’ appreciation and to push up the value of the dollar. 12
The dollars are then invested – usually in US Treasuries - and increase foreign holdings
of dollar reserves. The repatriation of dollars amplifies the direction and impact of the
Fed’s policy initiative by increasing downward pressure on interest rates and supplying
additional liquidity. Conversely, when the Fed tightens by selling government securities,
foreign central banks may be motivated to sell from their holdings and use the proceeds
to buy their own currencies to moderate dollar appreciation and downward pressure on
their own exchange rates – again, amplifying the impact of the Fed’s actions. 13
If the objective is to counter the impact of Fed policy on exchange rates, the
outcome in both cases is likely to be the opposite of that intended. Foreign central banks’
attempts to change exchange rates by buying and selling their own and other currencies
usually fail because the resources available for intervention are dwarfed by the size of
global market flows. But in the context of the US market, foreign official purchases and
sales of US Treasuries are comparable to or larger than those of the Fed and can
significantly change conditions in US domestic credit markets. Since the 1970s, foreign
official purchases have exceeded Federal Reserve purchases in many quarters and years
and, in time, their holdings grew larger than the Fed’s. Thus the fact that intervention
culminates in investment decisions that reinforce (rather than counter) Fed policy
initiatives is an equally potent factor in undercutting the effectiveness of intervention in
exchange markets.
Recent reserve accumulations by emerging economies differ from earlier
intervention initiatives by advanced economies in that dollars are acquired as payments
for goods and services and are exchanged for the home currency in domestic rather than
external markets. Their reinvestment in US financial assets adds liquidity to US credit
markets and may even counter Fed initiatives to raise interest rates and constrain credit
growth. Given that one objective of reserve accumulation is to raise the value of the
dollar, the reinvestment of dollars in US assets can be counterproductive since it
amplifies the easier market conditions that foster depreciation while impeding the shift to
tighter conditions that would attract additional private foreign investment and raise the
dollar’s value. However, by bolstering the availability of credit and thus contributing to
conditions that support import purchases, these investments help maintain access to the
US market – a major objective of countries that favor export-led growth.
Monetary analysts and the Fed itself have tended to ignore the implications of
these developments, but the size of the additions to dollar reserves in the years 2002
through 2005 make clear the need for concern about the central bank’s ability to offset
their impact on US interest rates and credit expansion. And, given their size, pressures
and incentives to re-export that liquidity are inevitable. Thus, intervention and reserve
accumulation have played a substantial role in reinforcing the round-robin pattern of
12

Because the Federal Reserve discourages holdings of foreign currency assets in the US, the exchange of
foreign currencies for dollars must take place offshore. Thus, intervention involves a repatriation of dollars
held outside the US.
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dollar interest and exchange rates.
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international capital flows in recent years. Moreover, it is likely that foreign currency
reserves’ highly procyclical role in amplifying the expansion and contraction of liquidity
in the market for the reserve currency would persist even if the euro, yen or other
currencies replaced the dollar.
How a Currency-based International Monetary System Exacerbates “Under” and
“Over” Saving
As we have argued, using national currencies as an international store of value
generates debt in key currency countries. The investment of external savings in the credit
instruments of that country tends to lower the cost and expand the availability of credit as
residents sell assets from their portfolios to foreign investors and seek to replace those
assets with comparable investments. If flows are not large, they can be sterilized by
issuing central bank liabilities to resident investors to mop up excess liquidity. The US,
however, has never used that tool and, in any event, flows had grown too large by the end
of the 1970s to be effectively sterilized by using traditional bank-centered quantity
controls such as increases in reserve requirements. 14 In addition, the rapid pace of
financial liberalization and restructuring in the 1980s - and the ongoing relaxation of
prudential lending standards – exacerbated conditions for the build-up in debt.
The household sector incurred the largest increase in debt in the period 1995 2005 and this increase was associated with a fall in the saving rate and a rise in
consumption as a share of total aggregate demand. 15 Given its availability and favorable
terms, many consumers viewed the cushion provided by access to credit as a substitute
for savings – particularly after 2002 when borrowing was used both to purchase
appreciating residential property and extract equity for spending. But businesses, too,
took advantage of low rates in bond markets to borrow for stock buy-backs that tended to
strengthen the bottom lines of managers rather than those of the firms they managed.
US monetary policy was complicit in these developments: maintaining interest
rate differentials favorable to the dollar to attract capital inflows in the latter half of the
1990s, allowing foreign savings to pump up credit growth and create asset booms 16 and
failing to moderate imbalances in credit flows with existing quantitative tools where
possible or insistence on prudential norms. Nowhere in the public pronouncements of the
central bank was there mention of concern about credit expansion or the effectiveness of
the existing means to control it. Suggestions that financial institutions follow prudential
norms were offered only after credit-fueled bubbles had already reached unsustainable
levels.

14

Moreover, foreign inflows were increasingly used to purchase financial assets in secondary markets
rather then invested in bank deposits, further weakening the Fed’s ability to sterilize them with existing,
bank-centered monetary tools.
15
Debt of the US household sector rose from 65.7 percent of GDP in 1995 to 92.1 percent at year-end
2005. The debt of the federal government fell over the same period from 49.2 percent of GDP to 37.7
percent, while that of nonfinancial businesses rose from 55.6 percent to 66.8 percent (FRS Flow of Funds).
16
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Emerging economies, too, have experienced high levels of credit growth and
spending since the 2002 recovery. In some of these countries, the buildup in global
liquidity has resulted in rising consumption. In others - China, for example – credit
expansion has bolstered spending on fixed investment. 17 For many emerging
economies, high saving rates and lagging consumption were re-enforced by the inability
to pay or receive their own currencies in external transactions. Given this constraint, they
adopted policies that channeled savings into the production of exports. Moreover, faced
with the need to maintain low prices and prevent exchange rate appreciation to remain
competitive in the global economy, they encouraged households to save as an alternative
to higher wages and government-provided safety nets. Imbalances arose as smaller
shares of households’ income and of the pools of credit they generated were channeled to
these savers.
Equally important, their inability to use domestic savings in external transactions
increased the vulnerability of soft-currency countries to external shocks. The
extraordinary build-up in reserves by emerging economies over the past decade is
indicative of the pressures to use surplus earnings from trade to construct a cushion
against those shocks. But to do so, they were required to lend their savings to strong
currency countries rather than invest them in their own economies. This imperative is a
further constraint on demand in these “high saving” countries as they amass idle
resources to cover needed imports and debt service in the event of future financial
crises. 18
The profit-seeking strategies of the large private financial institutions that
dominate the international payments system intensified emerging economies’
vulnerability to financial crises. As more developed and developing countries adopted
capital account liberalization in the 1990s, the valuation of currencies increasingly came
to depend on the arbitrage transactions of these institutions between different financial
instruments and markets rather than on trade (Cornford 2005). Changes in interest rate
differentials on assets denominated in different currencies now play a disproportionate
role in driving shifts in capital flows and currency values, exacerbating the problems of
monetary control on a global scale. Exposed to this dynamic, emerging economies lost
the ability to influence the buildup of external debt in their own economies and, again,
were forced to respond by amassing offsetting assets in the form of foreign exchange
reserves to cover their exposure. The growth in their foreign exchange reserves in the
1990s forged a link between “oversaving” at the international level and widening global
imbalances even as – on the positive side – they appear to have decreased developing
countries’ vulnerability to crises.

17

Spending for fixed investment in China accounted for 50 percent of total aggregate demand in 2005
(White, 2006).
18
While foreign exchange reserves held on the books of central banks provide support for expansions of
money and credit in the domestic economy, monetary authorities in these countries must sterilize some or
all of the buildup in reserves by selling holdings of domestic assets or issuing central bank liabilities to
prevent overexpansion. Both of these sterilization techniques inhibit the growth and stability of domestic
capital markets by constraining the central banks’ ability to support those markets.
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Part II Risks and Potential Consequences of Imbalances for the US and Global
Economies
While many agree that US deficits are unsustainable, there is no consensus view
on what set of circumstances or particular scenario might trigger a shift in the buildup of
US indebtedness. As former Chairman Greenspan (2003) noted, the sustainability of US
trade deficits depends on whether and for how long foreigners will be willing to increase
their holdings of dollars. In the case of the foreign private sector, some part of the
answer will depend on interest rate differentials favorable to the dollar and opportunities
for leveraged investment strategies such as carry trades that will continue to make
investments in short-term dollar assets attractive. For official investors with a longerterm outlook, the issue is more complicated. Concern about the buildup of huge
imbalances in reserve ownership became widespread when the holdings of Japan and
emerging Asia reached $2,444.7 billion or 64 percent of the global total at the end of
February 2005. The size of their holdings prompted worries that one or more of these
countries might decide to change the currency composition of their portfolios of reserves
and that this could precipitate a sell-off by other official and private investors (IMF
2004).
It is always possible that political developments could prompt sales of dollar
reserves, but depreciation is thought to be the most likely trigger for diversification.
Yields apparently do influence portfolio choices of official investors. In fact, after strong
growth in the 1990s, the dollar share of global reserves fell after 2000 and slipped below
65 percent at the end of 2004, down from 69.2 percent at year-end 2003. While
depreciation of existing holdings was certainly a factor in lowering the dollar’s share, the
increase in euro deposits of OPEC countries suggests that euro appreciation had also
begun to influence decisions about new reserve investments (BIS 2004a, 2004b),
Sales of foreign exchange assets denominated in one of the major currencies have
tended to be reinvested in assets denominated in another. But it is possible that – like
some Asian private investors who have withdrawn foreign currency deposits in
international banks for reinvestment in their own currencies at higher interest rates –
foreign central banks might simply liquidate some portion of their reserve holdings for
such purposes as reducing domestic and external government debt, financing
development projects or nationalizing foreign-owned companies and financial
institutions.
Meanwhile, some of the risks that might cause a shift in the buildup of US debt
could originate in the home economy rather than externally. In the aftermath of the
recent run-up in domestic debt, stagnant or falling home prices could push US households
to the limits of their capacity to borrow – the more so since increases in disposable
income lagged both GDP growth and net borrowing during the recent recovery. If
borrowing slows, spending is likely to slow as well and that, in turn, will trigger a slowdown in imports – an outcome that some might view as a soft landing in terms of
reducing the current account deficit.
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But slower import growth would also shrink the inflow of foreign capital. Losing
inflows of funding from foreign current account surpluses would contract the supply of
new credit to US consumers and businesses and that, in turn, would tend to push up
interest rates to levels that would attract an offsetting supply of domestic savings. The
shift in the availability and terms of credit would provide incentives to save but at the
cost of an additional constraint on spending and an even sharper drop in imports. 19
Should these or other developments trigger a shift in the buildup of US
indebtedness, one of several unwelcome scenarios might follow. For example, a scenario
in which declining housing prices halt or shrink credit growth and imports suggests a
period of stagnation in both the US and global economies like the long slowdown in
growth that Japan experienced in the 1990s. 20 A slowdown in overall foreign investment
would contribute to that ongoing stagnation but could also result in significant
deflationary pressures.
Given the extraordinary level of support foreign savings have provided for the
buildup in debt by the US government and private sectors since the 1980s, any significant
withdrawal of that support would not only constrict US credit availability but lower
prices of US financial assets as well. The enormous share of dollar assets held by both
private and official foreign investors would ensure that losses would be shared by both
borrowers and lenders, rapidly spilling over into markets for goods, services and financial
assets in virtually every other country in the world. Of particular concern would be the
deflationary impact of a contraction of global reserves as dollar reserves held by central
banks as backing for domestic credit fell in value.
The worst case scenario would be an actual draw-down of the stock of foreign
investment in US financial assets. Asset sales by foreigners could drive down prices to
levels that would shrink the net worth of households in the US and other countries, erode
the capital of financial institutions and precipitate a more rapid slide into deflation. If
such a scenario were to develop, the extent of damage to economies and financial
systems would depend on the size and rapidity of the rush to exit and/or the nature and
effectiveness of countercyclical responses. Again, the size of foreign private and official
dollar holdings suggests that an effective countercyclical response would require the
coordinated participation of many countries and, in particular, that of Japan and China.
Part III Efforts and Proposals to Address National and Global Imbalances
Many advanced and emerging economies have also experienced distortions in
their domestic markets similar to those that plagued the US economy. Associated with
19

Rising US interest rates might attract speculative private foreign inflows but their effect on asset prices
would quickly deflate in the context of waning aggregate demand.
20
The potential for a significant drop in US housing prices to precipitate a slowdown in spending is
exacerbated by the fact that residential mortgages account for over 30 percent of credit market debt of all
US nonfinancial sectors and almost all types of financial institutions hold mortgage loans (FRS, Flow of
Funds). Falling prices for homes would lower households’ net worth directly and through the feedback
effect of downward pressure on prices of mortgage paper held by the institutions in which households’
savings are invested.
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surges of capital inflows and reserve accumulation, growth in household debt and
overheated real estate markets became notable problems in central and eastern European
countries, Russia, Korea and Thailand by the middle of the current decade. Faced with
rising housing prices in the aftermath of the collapse of its credit card bubble, Korea’s
efforts in tackling the problem by imposing a range of fiscal and monetary restrictions
were particularly aggressive. 21 China has not been troubled by rising household debt but
its central bank began to tackle the problem of excessive lending to State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) by adopting quantitative controls such as changes in reserve
requirements, increased interest rates on discounting and lending facilities and “window
guidance”(BIS 2004a).
The BIS gave guarded approval to these initiatives in 2004 and, subsequently
proposed a macrofinancial stabilization framework that would use countercyclical
techniques in implementing both regulatory and monetary policies (2005a; White 2006)
This new framework would reintroduce quantitative measures such as liquidity
requirements and loan-to-value ratios, set prudential norms relating to the growth in
credit or asset prices and “use monetary and credit data as a basis for resisting financial
excesses in general, rather than inflationary pressures in particular” (BIS 2005a, p.148).
These are all welcome and sensible responses to the problem of widening
imbalances in domestic economies and a notable retreat from prescriptions for
deregulation and inflation targeting put in place in the two decades following the
ascendancy of free market ideology. The proposed BIS framework is not only desirable
but necessary and should be supported and adopted by US monetary and regulatory
authorities, as well as those in other advanced and emerging economies.
Nevertheless, few prescriptions have emerged to address the underlying problem
– the surges of capital flows that fuel credit expansion and the dangerous side effects
associated with the protection that reserve accumulation has provided for emerging
economies. The following section offers proposals that we believe would contribute to
crisis prevention by addressing the flaw in an increasingly unworkable international
reserve and payments system.
Dealing with International Monetary Issues
It is one of the ironies of the current international reserve system that the current
account surpluses of emerging economies are either loaned to a strong currency country
to assist in increasing its rate of growth or are recycled back to the emerging economies
in the form of private foreign acquisition and ownership of their financial assets and
productive facilities. One of the more pressing issues in dealing with global imbalances is
to find ways to recycle these countries’ savings back into their own economies in support
of development strategies that increase income and demand more equitably across their
21

These restrictions included higher capital gains taxes on sales of multiple residential properties; ceilings
on loan-to-value ratios for mortgage loans; limits on or penalties for aggressive credit card marketing;
credit ceilings based on the borrower’s income; increased loan provisioning by credit card issuers, and
requirements that borrowers repay a mandatory portion of their credit card debt (BIS 2004a).
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household and business sectors and reduce dependence on exports for growth. The
following is one proposal directed toward accomplishing those objectives.
Creating a Public International Investment Fund for Emerging Economies.
With the phenomenal growth of institutional investors’ assets over the last two
decades, foreign portfolio capital has become an important component of inflows into the
evolving securities markets of emerging economies. In most cases, however, these
inflows tend to change prices and exacerbate volatility in secondary markets rather than
provide long-term financing for economic expansion, while outflows often trigger or
intensify currency crises. Moreover, many developing countries that need long-term
financing for infrastructure and other basic components of development strategies do not
have markets that can absorb foreign portfolio investment flows nor the credit standing to
attract them. What is needed is a new channel for portfolio investment to provide flows
that are stable, in amounts appropriate to the size of a country’s economy and directed
toward the goals of development rather than solely toward the short-term profits of
investors.
Such a channel could be constructed by creating one or more closed-end funds for
emerging market investment as a separate institution under the Bretton Woods
umbrella. 22 These funds would issue their own liabilities to private and official investors
and use the proceeds to buy stocks and bonds of private enterprises and public agencies
in a wide spectrum of developing countries. While marketed primarily to institutional
investors in advanced economies, these liabilities would also qualify as international
reserves, guaranteed by a multinational agency and its member countries, and their
purchase by the central banks and government agencies of developing countries would
redirect external savings back into the economies of the countries that own them rather
than into the financial markets of strong currency countries.
International closed-in funds would provide additional benefits as well. They
would encourage the development of securities markets denominated in local currencies
in poor and middle-income developing countries, would reduce the need for capital
controls if countries chose to accept foreign portfolio investment only through this
channel, and would help pension plans in developing countries diversify their portfolios
while minimizing country risk and transactions costs.

22

Unlike open-end mutual funds that must buy back an unlimited number of shares in response to
investors’ demand, closed-end investment pools issue a finite number of shares that trade on stock
exchanges or in over-the-counter markets and are only redeemed at the initiative of the fund itself. This
structure would allow the prices of shares to fluctuate without triggering destabilizing purchases and sales
of the underlying investments. The structure could be made more suitable for long-term investors such as
pension funds by requiring that 10 to 20 percent of the value of shares sold to investors be used to purchase
and hold government securities of major industrial countries in amounts roughly proportional to the
holdings of the funds’ shares by residents of those countries. This would give investors a partial
guaranteed return, denominated in their own currencies, and capital backing in addition to the guarantee of
the multilateral agency and its member countries. Moreover, the introduction of these securities would
benefit both private and official investors by adding more low-risk instruments with long maturities to the
menu of assets in international financial markets.
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A more important contribution of these funds, however, would be their
inauguration of a meaningful shift into a non-national reserve asset and the phasing out of
a system in which the choice of financial assets as reserve holdings centers on a few
countries whose wealth supports the strength of their currencies. 23 Encouraging
developing countries to hold these securities as reserves would provide them with a
multilateral guarantee from industrial countries and, in time, from wealthier emerging
economies. 24
Given the focus on development, a major function of the funds should be to
finance infrastructure that is both commercially and socially useful. Both criteria would
be met by projects that build and improve roads, construct or renew sewers and extend
electrical grids and communications systems. But these projects must be initiated in
remote areas as well as cities and towns. Other areas qualifying for financing should
include systems to provide health care and clean water, projects for cleaning up polluted
areas and restoring and preserving forests, investments in renewable energy and
transportation and in local institutions that will provide funding for communities to
design and build their own affordable housing.
These and many other similar investment areas are among those that fail to
attract financing in the marketplace in both developing and advanced economies. For
example, the US found it necessary to undertake a wide range of public-purpose market
innovations in the 1930s – most notably the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the
Tennessee Valley Authority – and continued adding new strategies into the 1970s,
including the development of the secondary mortgage market. These and numerous other
examples from other countries underscore the need for governments to take the lead in
laying the institutional groundwork for financing productive economic and social
investments. Another indication of that need is the fact that, even in many advanced
economies, investments in renewable energy, infrastructure, the environment,
transportation and affordable housing are seriously underfinanced.
Structuring such a channel for portfolio investment need not reinvent the wheel.
Mechanisms and potential assets already exist in the marketplace and the authority to
manage these funds is wholly consistent with the World Bank’s original mandate to
facilitate private investment in developing countries. Moreover, the Bank’s experience in
issuing its own liabilities in international capital markets would expedite the start-up of
one or more closed-end funds which could then be transferred to a separate institutional
structure created for the purpose.
But, like other Bretton Woods institutions, these public sector funds must be
required to operate in a far more open, accountable and responsive fashion than is the
23

Wealthy countries, too, could hold these securities as reserves and avoid the credit-generating effects
their reserve investments impose on other advanced economies. The credit-generating capacity of reserve
assets could then be utilized multilaterally to benefit a wider group of countries – developed and
developing – and moderate the constraint on demand that imbalances in external savings have created.
24
The institutional guarantee would be the same as the existing guarantee for World Bank liabilities, but
the capital investment in the government securities of advanced economies would enhance that guarantee
and provide a partial hedge against exchange rate risk.
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current norm. Properly structured to include collaborative decision-making by both the
managers of the funds and the countries in which investments are made, they could make
a significant down payment against the democratic deficits that characterize private
portfolio investment decisions as well as governance and policymaking at the
international institutions.
Reforming the International Payments System
The above proposal – to use international credit liabilities as reserve assets – is
evolutionary in nature and, while it addresses a critical flaw in the current international
monetary system, an equally critical one – the means of payment - would still need to be
addressed. Permitting the continuation of a key or strong currency regime for crossborder transactions tends to perpetuate the export-led growth paradigm by requiring the
majority of countries to shape their economies to ensure that they can earn – or borrow –
key currencies to conduct external trade and investment transactions. Ideally, every
country should be able to use its own currency and the wealth created within its own
borders to participate in the global economy. An equitable and laudable solution, no
doubt – but how might it be arranged?
One way would be to mine John Maynard Keynes’ Bretton Woods proposal to
create a new institutional framework that would accomplish that objective. While
Keynes’ overall proposal was designed for a very different world, the basic structure in
his concept - an international clearing agency (ICA) - could be revised to serve as the
institutional platform for a new global payments system that would foster more
egalitarian objectives and outcomes. A revision of Keynes’ proposed structure is
necessary because payments imbalances are no longer settled by transactions through
central banks but through private financial institutions. An ICA that would meet current
needs and conditions would have to include a mechanism for clearing private crossborder payments as well as create a reserve system that would reinstate transactions
among central banks as the primary channel for settling balance of payments surpluses
and deficits.
The proposed ICA would clear transactions denominated in members’ own
currencies and change the ownership of reserves by crediting and debiting their clearing
accounts. These clearing accounts would, in fact, constitute the international reserves of
the system, held for the member countries by the ICA and valued using a trade-weighted
basket of all members’ currencies. Thus the clearing process would change the
ownership of reserves and reinstate the original intent of the Bretton Woods Agreement
to maintain public control of international payments. It would also permit exchange rate
adjustments over a set period of time in response to changes in reserve levels, preserving
the valid role of market forces in shaping currency values through trade and investment
flows while ensuring that speculators would no longer dominate the process.
A revised ICA proposal could also reintroduce former US Undersecretary of the
Treasury Harry White’s Bretton Woods proposal to authorize the International Monetary
Fund to engage in open market operations by permitting the new clearing agency to
acquire government securities of its member countries as backing for its reserve

14

holdings. 25 This would give the ICA means and authority to conduct open market
operations at the international level, enabling it to correct imbalances and promote
stability by altering holdings of international reserves relative to national central bank
reserves invested in domestic assets. When approved by a super-majority of its member
countries, the ICA’s money creating powers would also allow it to operate as a true
lender-of-last resort – a role the IMF cannot play given its dependence on taxpayer
contributions. In this capacity, the ICA could assist a national central bank in supplying
or contracting liquidity by buying or selling government securities from or to residents in
the national market – actions that would augment or reduce the country’s supply of
international reserves.
Membership in the ICA would be open to national central banks of all
participating countries and branches of the clearing agency would operate in every major
financial center across the globe. The Agency would be governed by a rotating executive
committee that would at all times represent half the world’s population and half its total
output. Its role in clearing members’ payments in their own currencies ensures that it
would not infringe on their sovereignty as would an international central bank that issued
a single currency. 26 The conduct of national monetary policy would remain the
prerogative of national authorities. But the ICA’s ability to create and extinguish
international reserves would give it the power to change the availability of liquidity at the
global level. The absence of and need for that power has been increasingly evident
throughout the post-Bretton Woods era as crisis after crisis has underscored the
inadequacy of the current institutional framework.
This is a brief sketch of a proposal offered elsewhere that attempts to incorporate
the still-valid objectives of the Bretton Woods Agreement for an open international
trading system while reforming the institutional framework to promote more egalitarian
participation by all countries in the global economy (D’Arista 1999). No doubt other,
better systems could and will be designed. But they, too, must incorporate a more
egalitarian payments system as well as more democratic governance of its institutional
structure.

25

In the US, the Federal Reserve had developed open market operations as a countercyclical policy tool in
the 1920s, but it was not widely used by other central banks at the time of the Bretton Woods negotiations
and the White proposal was dropped from the agreement.
26
Not only would the ICA not issue the international means of payment, it also would not create and issue
reserves the way the IMF issues Special Drawing Rights. Its primary role would be to administer the
process by which cross-border payments alter the reserve accounts of member countries. Its design is
intended to enhance sovereignty by allowing all countries to use their national currencies to make
international payments and by reducing the influence of speculative capital flows on policy decisions at the
national level. The only choice member countries would lose would be their ability to decide how to invest
their international reserves since their reserves would automatically be invested in their own national
liabilities.
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Table 1: U.S. International Investment Position, Year-end 2004 -2005 i
Net Creditor/Debtor (-)
Position

Change:
2004-2005
Financial Valuation
Total
ii
2004
2005
Flows
Adjustments Change
$U.S.
As Pct.
$U.S.
As Pct.
$U.S.
$U.S.
$U.S.
billions
GDP iii
billions
GDP
billions
billions
billions
-2,448.7
-20.5
-2,546.2
-20.1
-785.4
466.1
-97.4
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of
Current Business
i

Net Creditor/Debtor (-)
Position

Direct investment positions at market value.
Includes price changes, exchange rate changes, changes in coverage, statistical discrepancies and other
adjustments to the value of the assets.
iii
GDP in current dollars
ii

Table 2: Selected Components of U.S. International Investment Position, Year-end 2004-2005
($U.S. billions)

2004
U.S.-owned assets abroad
U.S. government assets
Official reserve assets
Other assets
U.S. private assets
Direct investment abroad
Foreign securities
Bonds
Corporate stocks
Non-bank claims
Claims reported by banks

10,073,337
272,653
189,591
83,062
9,802,684
3,287,900
3,553,387
992,969
2,560,418
733,538
2,227,859

2005
11,079,202
265,566
188,043
77,523
10,813,636
3,524,459
4,073,997
987,543
3,086,454
784,521
2,430,659

Change: 2004-2005
Financial
Valuation
Flows
Adjustments
426,801
-19,635
-14,096
-5,539
446,436
9,072
180,125
37,991
142,134
44,221
213,018

577,064
12,548
12,548
----564,516
227,487
340,485
-32,565
383,902
6,762
-10,218

Total
Change
1,003,865
-7,087
-1,548
-5,539
1,010.952
236,559
520,610
-5,426
526,036
50,983
202,800

Foreign-owned assets in the U.S.
12,524,081
13,625,377
1,212,250
-110,954
1,101,296
Foreign official assets
2,001,407
2,216,123
199,495
15,221
214,716
U.S. government securities
1,499,293
1,649,397
156,450
-6,346
150,104
Other U.S. assets
502,114
566,726
43,045
21,567
64,612
Other foreign held assets
10,522,674
11,409,254
1,012,755
-126,175
886,580
Direct investment
2,703,697
2,797,165
109,754
-16,286
93,468
U.S. Treasury securities
562,288
704,875
199,491
-56,904
142,587
Other U.S. securities
3,995,506
4,390,682
474,140
-78,964
395,176
Corporate and other bonds
2,035,149
2,275,197
388,357
-148,309
240,048
Corporate stocks
1,960,357
2,115,485
85,783
69,345
155,128
U.S. non-bank liabilities
507,668
563,749
30,105
25,976
56,081
U.S. liabilities reported by banks
2,420,780
2,600.632
179,849
3
179,852
U.S. currency
332,735
352,151
19,416
----19,416
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business.
NOTE: 2004 figures are revised; 2005 figures are preliminary. Valuation adjustments include changes in prices, exchange rates, coverage,
statistical discrepancies, and other adjustments to the value of assets. Direct investment is at market value. Numbers may not add up due to
rounding.

